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Users are increasingly demanding two contradictory system 
properties – the ability to absolutely, positively erase information 
so that it cannot be recovered, and the ability to recover 
information that was inadvertently or intentionally altered or 
deleted. Storage system designers now need to resolve the tension 
between complete delete and time machine computing.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Two exciting storage security products will reach the market in 
2007. One will allow users to instantly delete an entire hard 
drive’s worth of information so that it can never be recovered. 
The second will allow computer users to recover information 
days, weeks or even months after it has been changed or deleted, 
whether by accident or on purpose.  
2. THE TENSION 
Clearly, the goals of these two systems are in conflict. What’s 
more, the way that technologists decide to resolve these conflicts 
will have deep implications for personal privacy, corporate 
security, law enforcement and even national security. Should 
computer systems provide their users with the ability to 
absolutely delete information, or should some kind of information 
trace be preserved if at all possible? Should users have the ability 
to selectively completely delete information—akin to removing 
pages from a diary or accounting ledger without leaving a trace? 
Or should users only have the ability to take a computer and 
“reset to installation,” wiping out all information at the same time 
and leaving an affirmative record that a wipe operation has taken 
place? 
The increase in storage capacity afforded by modern hard drives 
combined with increasingly powerful trusted systems and 
pervasive connectivity means that we can build systems that 
implement any policy that we can clearly articulate. Indeed, 
commercial variations on all of these themes are being introduced 
into the marketplace in 2007. How we choose to resolve these 
conflicts will ultimately be an exercise in both engineering and 
policy making. 
2.1 Complete Delete 
In January 2003, Shelat and I reported that roughly one third of 
158 hard drives purchased on the secondary market between 
November 2000 and August 2002 contained confidential or highly 
sensitive information that should never have been released.[4] For 
example, one drive had been used in an ATM machine and still 
contained customer financial information. Another drive 
contained more than 3,700 credit card numbers from a terminal 
that had been used to submit charges from a supermarket to a 
bank.
Shelat and I hypothesized that many of the people who had left 
confidential data on the drives in our study had attempted to 
delete the information but had failed in their attempts. In many 
cases individuals had explicitly deleted the files containing 
sensitive information, apparently unaware that deleted files are 
not overwritten until the space is needed for other purposes. In 
other cases the drive’s previous owners had used the Windows 
FORMAT command to wipe the hard drive, not realizing that the 
command doesn’t actually overwrite file data. We were able to 
recover the data left behind using forensic tools, but the previous 
owners, having only the operating system tools at their disposal, 
would have reasonably thought that they had removed the 
confidential information. Our suppositions were confirmed by 
follow-up interviews.[3] 
For years there have been third-party utilities for selectively 
overwriting individual files or even entire hard drives. But these 
utilities have two big drawbacks: because they are not included 
with the operating system, many users don’t know about them. 
And because these utilities rely upon overwriting to erase 
information, they can be quite slow. For example, Apple added a 
“Secure Empty Trash” feature to its MacOS operating system 
following the publication of the 2003 study to give users a reliable 
means to remove confidential information from their hard drives. 
Secure Empty Trash uses a seven-pass overwrite for each file 
being deleted to assure that the information cannot be recovered 
by any means, and is very slow as a result.  
But in principle there is no reason that this kind of “complete 
delete” functionality needs to be slow. Secure Empty Trash could 
do its overwriting in the background. What’s more, for disk drives 
manufactured after 2001, a single overwriting pass is now 
generally regarded to be sufficient.[6] And by utilizing 
cryptography, sanitization can be made virtually instantaneous.  
2.2 Cryptographic Erasing 
In 1996 Boneh et al. proposed a tape backup system “[that] 
applies cryptography in a new way…  to erase information rather 
than protect it.” [1] Boneh’s scheme encrypted files as they were 
written to a backup tape, storing the key for each backup of each 
file in a master key file. At a later point in time a specific version 
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of a backed up file could be “revoked” by removing the key 
corresponding to that file and version. Alas, Boneh’s system did 
not provide for total data destruction because “the removed [key] 
can still be found in the backup version of the key-file.” 
Boneh’s system can be improved by implementing it and the 
required key management directly inside a storage device. For 
example, Garfinkel and Shelat proposed equipping disk drives 
with “a cryptographic subsystem that automatically encrypts 
every disk block when the block is written, and decrypts the block 
when it is read back. Users could then render the drive’s contents 
unintelligible by securely erasing the key.”[4] 
This spring Seagate will introduce this approach exactly in the 
company’s Moments 5400 FDE.2 disk drive. The drive features 
Seagate’s new DriveTrust technology, an integrated encryption 
module that provides for full disk encryption, drive pairing 
(locking a drive to a specific host), cryptographically hidden 
partitions, and secure erase and disposal. “If the encryption key is 
changed or eliminated, all of the data is instantly rendered 
inaccessible.”[9] Seagate calls this technology “Crypto Erase.” 
(Decru incorporated a similar approach into its line of enterprise 
storage security appliances in late 2003, calling the approach 
“CryptoShred.”[2] But because it was designed to be used in a 
data center, the Decru technology would not have prevented most 
of the data incidents that Garfinkel and Shelat uncovered.) 
Technologies like Crypto Erase and Secure Empty Trash make it 
relatively easy for users to wipe files and media so that data 
cannot be recovered. Although it is commonly reported in the 
popular media that it’s all but impossible to delete information 
from a computer in such a way that it can’t be recovered by a 
trained forensic examiner, in practice this is no longer true. 
2.3 Time Machine Computing 
At the very same time that systems are incorporating better 
technology for permanently erasing information, they are also 
getting improved technology for recovering information that’s 
been erased—either accidentally or intentionally. 
Apple’s Time Machine, schedule to be released with MacOS 10.5, 
is perhaps one of the best examples of easy-to-use file recovery 
technology. Time Machine automatically writes files that are 
changed to a chronologically-indexed database residing on an 
external hard drive. Users in the future can recover data that has 
been changed or deleted by clicking the Time Machine icon and 
then going “back in time” — that is, by searching chronically 
backwards through the archive until the desired information 
appears.
Although incremental backups have been used for decades and 
Rekimoto demonstrated time-machine computing in 1999[8], 
Apple’s Time Machine is likely to stand out for several reasons: 
1. By integrating with existing applications like Apple’s 
Finder and Address Book, Time Machine lets users 
browse through their backups using graphical user 
interfaces that they have already mastered. The only 
new interface that needs to be mastered is the temporal 
browser, which appears to be very simple.  
2. By utilizing the operating system’s ability to report 
changes, Time Machine eliminates the need to 
continually scan the entire system for changes. This 
reduces the overhead of running the program which, 
consequentially, making it more likely that Time 
Machine will actually be run.  
3. Unlike traditional backup systems that were designed to 
work with serial-access storage devices like tape, Time 
Machine is designed to work with high-capacity 
random-access storage devices as typified by external 
hard drives. Such drives are now cheaply available and 
have capacities in the hundreds of gigabytes 
According to Apple, less than 25% of its users back up their 
computer in any way, and only 4% make ongoing backups—this, 
despite the fact that Apple’s dot-Mac service includes an 
automated online backup system. Because it combines simplicity 
and comprehensiveness, Apple’s Time Machine could prove to be 
quite popular and a model for future backup systems on other 
platforms.
2.4 Reconciling Complete Delete and Time 
Machine
What is the proper way for complete delete technologies like 
Apple’s Secure Empty Trash and Crypto Erase to interact with 
pervasive backup technologies Apple’s Time Machine? Since 
Time Machine hasn’t shipped to customers, we don’t know how 
Apple will address this real conflict between the desire to 
permanently delete information and the desire to recover 
information that is accidentally lost. Indeed, no matter how Apple 
ultimately addresses this question in MacOS 10.5, this is sure to 
be a question that is hotly debated in the coming years—and not 
just at Apple’s headquarters in Cupertino, but among the users of 
all computer systems, and perhaps even by lawmakers in 
Washington and other national capitals.
If the user drags a file to the Trash Can and then chooses Secure 
Empty Trash, MacOS could simultaneously delete the file’s 
backups from Time Machine. There have been several posts in 
MacOS user forums from users who say that this is the behavior 
that they expect. On the other hand, accidentally deleting files 
with Secure Empty Trash seems to be the very sort of mistake that 
Time Machine should protect against.
Even if Secure Empty Trash should delete the backup from Time 
Machine, this might not be possible. Time Machine relies upon an 
external hard drive to keep its backup. One of the advantages of 
this approach is that it makes disaster recovery a lot easier. If a 
laptop’s hard drive crashes or the laptop is lost, Time Machine 
can reload the user’s backup onto a computer with a newly 
installed copy of MacOS. But what should Secure Empty Trash 
do it if the external drive is not connected when the user invokes 
the command: should it warn the user that the backups will not be 
securely deleted, or should it remember the command and delete 
the backups when the drive is later attached?  
One way around this conundrum would be to gimmick both 
commands so that Secure Empty Trash is disabled if Time 
Machine is operational. But this seems like the wrong approach as 
well.
Faced with this sort of quandary, many programmers would throw 
up their hands and give the choice to the user. Perhaps an alert 
box should appear: “You have chosen Secure Empty Trash, but 
many of these files are also present in your Time Machine 
backup. Do you wish to erase the Time Machine copies as well?” 
If the user chooses “yes,” then the computer could insist that the 
Time Machine drive be plugged in so that it could be properly 
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scrubbed. Alternatively, if the files on Time Machine were 
protected with a backup system that supported CryptoShredding, 
the per-file encryption key could simply be erased. 
The problem with all of these approaches is that the user who has 
chosen Secure Empty Trash is likely to be equally sanguine about 
deleting the Time Machine Backups—especially in those very 
times that the user is making a mistake. For example, the user 
might be deleting the wrong files. Or the user doing the deleting 
might not be authorized to do so—for example, my daughter 
might be deleting my tax returns because she needs more space 
for downloading movies, and she might have chosen “Secure 
Empty Trash” because she didn’t want to leave a trace of what 
she had done. The user might even be attempting to hide illegal 
activity.  
In the 1990s the US government proposed that industry adopt 
“CLIPPER Chip” which would have given consumers and 
businesses strong encryption, but give the US government a back 
door to the data. The proposal was rejected by businesses and 
consumers alike. However, if strong deletion technologies create 
problems for law enforcement, there may be similar calls to 
control the technology. One can imagine a strong delete system 
resource that only deletes information if the deletion action is 
logged with a centralized service, effectively allowing people to 
destroy evidence but not to hide the fact that evidence has been 
destroyed. A more invasive solution might not delete data at all, 
but merely re-encrypt the data using a key that was only available 
to law enforcement operating under the appropriate legal 
authority.   
2.5 Delayed Unrecoverable Actions 
One way to resolve some of the tension between perfect deletion 
and perfect retention is to retreat from immediacy and absolutes. 
Norman observed in 1983 that simple confirmation boxes (e.g. 
Figure 1) for unrecoverable actions frequently fail to prevent error 
on the part of the user because the act of confirming the action is 
rapidly assimilated into the act that the box is intended to confirm. 
“the normal response to requests for confirmation is something 
like this: “Yes, yes, yes, yes. Oh dear!” [7] 
As an alternative, Norman suggests a mechanism in which “the 
command can act as if it were actually executed, when in fact, it 
has only been deferred.”[7] The computer executes the command 
at a later point in time, presumably after the user’s attention 
switches focus, allowing the unconscious mind the opportunity to 
examine the action. We may call this kind of command a 
“delayed unrecoverable action.” (Amazon.com’s 1-Click Express 
Ordering System [5] is another example of a delayed 
unrecoverable action, in that 1-click orders can be changed or 
canceled after they are made but before they are shipped.) 
Figure 1: Confirmation boxes such as this (also known as “swat 
boxes”) frequently do not achieve their designer’s goals of having 
the user consider the effects of an unrecoverable action, because 
clicking the “OK” confirmation becomes part of the action that 
the box is intended to confirm. An alternative approach is to let 
users initiate their actions but give them an opportunity to change 
their mind at a later point in time. 
Delayed unrecoverable actions can be combined with 
cryptographic erasing in an interesting way. Instead of erasing the 
entire key, initiating a cryptographic erasure could instead erase 
one bit of the key every hour. The result is to make recovery of 
the deleted information computationally harder for each passing 
period of time. Within a few hours, the information could be 
speedily recovered. But after a day, it would take 4 hours of 
computer time to recover the cryptographic key (assuming that 
the computer could search through 1000 keys every second.) 
After two days it would require 8925 years of computer time to 
recover a key—completely within the realm of today’s grid 
computers, but not a trivial undertaking. After three days, the data 
would not be recoverable for any practical purpose. An algorithm 
with a slower ramp to unrecoverability would be to randomly set 
one of the key’s 128 bits to a 0 every hour.  
3. CONCLUSION 
Modern computer systems are simultaneously making it easier to 
delete information forever and making it easier to retain 
information after it has been accidentally or intentionally deleted.  
Interestingly, both of these capabilities will be deployed to 
consumers in Apple’s MacOS 10.5 operating system, scheduled to 
be released later this year. What is not clear is how these two 
apparently irreconcilable features should interact with each other 
and with the user. We pose this as an open question for storage 
and usability experts alike. 
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